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In this condensed survey, I look to recent perspectives on evolution suggesting that cultural change may 
alter the genome. Since theories of development are nested within assumptions about evolution (evo-
devo), I next review some oft-cited developmental theories and other psychological theories of the 20th 
century to see if any match the emerging perspectives in evolutionary theory. I seek theories based 
neither in nature (genetics) nor nurture (the environment) but in the creative play of human 
communication responding to necessity. This survey finally looks to more recent work to do with the 
appearance of independent self-consciousness in the individual following empathic group awareness. 
The result of such self-created group awareness and symbolic communication is seen to be cultural 
consciousness, unique to humanity, from which individual consciousness and personhood derive. I 
conclude by noting the general implications for these approaches in our schools, politics, and in 
ultimate ontological questions. 
1. Introduction 
Despite the rhetorical encouragement in curriculum guides toward cooperative projects and group 
learning, it seems most schooling in the English-speaking world remains largely competitive and 
individualistic. Considering the predominant theories of human development, learning, and the evolution 
of the human mind, this should be no surprise. Evolutionary or developmental theories have 
concentrated either on the species or on the individual, in either case reducing it to a pattern that 
determines the “nature” of said species or individual. Despite recent work on the emergence of altruism 
(e.g., Fletcher & Doebeli, 2009; de Waal, 2008), there have been few evolutionary or developmental 
theories that give precedence to group dynamics as the ground of unique human behaviour and 
individuality.  
In the last century, behaviourism tended to see the individual as a hedonistic cipher blindly pursuing 
pleasurable feelings and avoiding painful ones. Evolutionary theories (especially the neo-evolutionists 
who followed Darwin) also emphasized the selfishness of the individual who sought only to be the 
fittest, survive the longest, and reproduce the most. So, very broadly speaking, both nurture – the 
environmental conditioning aspect of behaviourism – and nature – our genetic inheritance – see the 	119
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individual as a self-seeking monad, which fits quite well into the ethos of a capitalist economy driven by 
the enlightened self-interest of Adam Smith (1776/1994). This could be coincidental, or not. 
There is little question that the predominant metaphors for the human mind these days are the computer 
and the brain. Yes, the brain, for no matter how many neuroscience images of the brain in action we see, 
we are still not seeing experiential consciousness. To experience consciousness, we must be subjectively 
conscious. These two metaphors continue the idea of the isolated human being, in this case, the human 
mind, exhibiting behaviours that arise in isolation and could, in theory, be fully understood once we 
understand the computational brain. The brain’s functioning “wetware” is seen as equivalent to the 
“hardware” of a computer (or computer networks). Thus much of learning theory, from brain-based 
learning to standardized tests, caters to this neural-computational metaphor, implying that behaviour and 
thought are predetermined by the material substrate that supports them. Thus education should be based 
on the information processing of the individual via the tried and true transmit and test model of 
education.  1
Social psychology and evolutionary anthropology are still very active and a good deal of research is 
being done into the communal origins of the human mind, but such things do not receive the media 
attention that any new discovery linked to evolutionary psychology, computer consciousness, or headed 
with the prefix neuro- automatically attracts (cf. LeGrenzi & Umiltà, 2011). Check any newsstand to see 
the titles of lead stories. It seems we are more comfortable imagining ourselves as software programs on 
the neurochemical hardware of the brain or as conditioned by our genes than we are imagining ourselves 
as the product of the choices we make together. This is the aim of this excursus – to trace the breaks in 
this pattern of individual isolation and determinism and see where cultural creativity has occasionally 
broken through, especially in evolutionary theory and in theories of human development, and to outline 
three major researches that indicate the communal origin of human conscious experience — that is, 
cultural consciousness as the singular human achievement that is the source of individual consciousness 
and personhood.  
My second section below is a condensed survey through the history of evolutionary ideas with special 
attention to the visionary ideas of Jablonka and Lamb (2006). The third section runs through 
developmental theories, seeking hints of cultural creativity with a trajectory that should be easy to 
follow. Following this, the fourth section focuses on the recent research of Tomasello and Rochat that 
brings cooperation, shared identity, and language back into evo-devo theories. Finally, I will conclude by 
noting the implications of these researches in education, politics, and, speculatively, an ontological 
worldview.  
2. Evolution 
2.1 Survey 
First, many have seen parallels between long-term evolution of the human species and short-term 
development in the individual human being – in other words, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. Without 
 This is in spite of so-called brain-based learning that, in general, vastly exaggerates the plasticity of the brain and 1
encourages education based on experience and novelty (see Nixon, 2013), just as John Dewey recommended in 1916.
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getting into this in detail, this recapitulation has not been shown to be exact, not even in the close 
resemblance of the human zygote to that of a fish, but, generally speaking, patterns of individual 
development do seem similar to those that we know from human evolution, especially in early childhood 
development (Rochat, 2009; Tomasello, 2014). So it can be seen that the way evolution is understood 
will have a bearing on the way we view individual development. This macrocosm/microcosm pattern is 
colloquially known as evo-devo. 
Darwin proposed natural selection with an emphasis on the individual organism, but it should be noted 
that the other originator of evolutionary theory, Alfred Russel Wallace, emphasized group selection and 
even went so far as to suggest evolutionary change worked in a manner that current systems theory 
suggests (Kottler, 1985; Maturana & Varela, 1980). This indicates that research into developmental 
theories might look to group dynamics more than to the genetics and motivations of the individual. 
Darwin wrote before the discoveries of Gregor Mendel in genetics that explained the mechanisms 
through which evolutionary change occur, but he would have been helped immensely by this 
knowledge, especially including genetic mutations, of which only a very few prove to be fortuitous. 
However, Mendel did not recognize learning as having an evolutionary effect (Bowler, 2003).  
It’s the early neo-Darwinists like Thomas Huxley and Herbert Spencer, and, later ones like Richard 
Dawkins, who push the hard line that evolution is random, without purpose, and rarely affected by the 
life experience or learning of individual or sub-group species members. It should not be forgotten that 
Darwin’s original theories did not rule out the suggestion of Lamarck that a single life’s experience can 
alter the traits that are passed on in evolution (Bowler, 2003). Neither did original Darwinism deny the 
possibility that learning in life by a small group or an individual could prolong the life of a species long 
enough for it to accommodate such learning and for evolution to take place, as in the simultaneous 
theorizing of American palaeontologist Henry Fairfield Osborne, English psychologist Conway Lloyd 
Morgan, and American psychologist James Mark Baldwin in what became somewhat unfairly known as 
the “Baldwin effect” (Baldwin, 1894; Jablonka & Lamb, 2006). 
More recently, however, systems theory indicates that any identifiable system (including evolution) is 
open and subject to change from within, known as autopoiesis in the theories of Humberto Maturana 
and Francisco Varela (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Cull, 2013). This implies the potential for self-inspired 
creation (Capra, 1996). Geneticist Mae Wan Ho (2003) has reinvigorated vitalism by suggesting that 
evolutionary change results from multiple causes, some of them in one lifetime, as in Lamarkism. 
Furthermore, the meaningless, random nature of evolution has been questioned by noted philosopher 
Thomas Nagel in his little book, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinist Conception of 
Nature is Almost Certainly False (2012), in which he presents arguments for a natural (non-deistic) 
teleology or purpose in evolution. Biologist Stuart Kauffman (2008) has made the case for nature’s 
processes being less subject to the “laws” of nature than to nature’s creativity, which he calls the natural 
sacred, no God or gods required. 
2.2 Jablonka and Lamb 
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There have been many others who have let some fresh air into the random determinism  of neo-2
Darwinian evolutionary theories, but the recent of work of Jablonka and Lamb, Evolution in Four 
Dimensions: Epigenetic, Behavioural, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life (2006), goes so far 
as to accept the likelihood of a self-constructive humanity, especially with regard to cultural change 
affecting fundamental evolutionary genetics. This is a watershed book, though its ideas remain 
controversial for mainstream science. 
As can be seen from the title, the strict neo-Darwinism of it’s all in the genes and genes determine 
human nature is rejected in favor of four dimensions that change genetic inheritance. These dimensions 
are not randomly chosen but appear as the result of a great deal of thought and research by the authors, 
each of whom is well-recognized in her field. Jablonka is a Professor at the Cohn Institute for the 
History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas at Tel Aviv University, and Lamb was Senior Lecturer at 
Birkbeck College, University of London, before her retirement. Previously, they have published widely 
on epigenetics. 
Jablonka and Lamb describe the four dimensions in order, beginning with most widely accepted image 
of evolution as based in DNA transfer and recombination, subject to random mutations. The second 
dimension, epigenetics, is their specialty and thus a good deal of the book is dedicated to it. Epi- 
meaning after is an appropriate name for structurally altered DNA found to have occurred after birth or, 
in rare cases, just before it. The epigenetic effect on the immune system has been well established, but 
some have dismissed it as occurring only very early after birth (or possibly before) in response to the 
primary caregiver (Dean & Maggert, 2015). Jablonka and Lamb see epigenetic alteration as a possibility 
all through life and suggest the plasticity of neural functioning as an example of it. Many other 
researchers (e.g., Meaney, 2010) accept that epigenetics in child development is proof of the 
interdependence of gene and environment in the regulation of phenotype. 
The third dimension is behavioural learning found in the animal kingdom (which includes humanity). 
When an individual animal or small groups of them manage to learn a successful new way of dealing 
with a situation through either breakthrough insight as in gestalt (Köhler, 1927) or the trial and error of 
the learning curve, such learning, if shared through mimesis, will be carried on and eventually alter the 
genetic propensity for such behaviour. A good example of this is the Japanese macaque monkey 
(Macaca fuscata) that learned to keep warm in winter by bathing in open hot springs. Macaques now 
appear to unhesitatingly enter such hot springs without having been previously exposed to them 
(Kawamura, 1959). 
The final dimension is symbolism, as in symbolic interaction, which the authors base on the estimable 
philosophic project of Ernst Cassirer (e.g., 1944). Such symbolism (mostly due to language – though 
music, math, art, etc. are mentioned as other symbolic systems) is found primarily in human beings 
though the authors are amenable to extending this franchise to certain primate populations, like bonobo, 
that have been reared by humans. Seemingly based solely on work with bonobos by Sue Savage-
 Random because in neo-Darwinism genetic mutations occur randomly and evolution is regarded as purposeless, and 2
determinism because evolutionary genetics determines what each individual life will be like.
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Rumbaugh (e.g., Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994; Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker, & Taylor, 1998), they 
take the long, slow, early evolution of language approach. They do, however, cite the highly regarded 
Terrence Deacon (1997) to indicate that language and the brain co-evolved, that is, each influenced the 
development of the other. In this view, language emerged naturally and gradually from earlier 
communication systems based, apparently, in mimesis and nominative indications (such as pointing, 
gesturing, signalling, or various codes of behaviour) rather than from teaching, as formal symbolic 
(abstract) systems require.  
The authors seem unacquainted with the post-Saussurean structuralist tradition in which formal language 
structures – words and phrases – are understood as self-referential, an important and often ignored 
insight. As this theory would have it, meaning or semantics is only possible within an already complete 
language system. Language itself is the background referent, not the external world. If this is so (and it 
is controversial), language could not have slowly evolved but must have, instead, appeared 
comparatively suddenly – say, over generations rather than millennia – and grown rapidly as new 
vocabulary and syntactic elaborations were desperately sought to appease the now abstractly thinking 
human mind – seeking causes for effects and other narrative explanations mainly in mythic sources. 
French postmodern linguist Julia Kristeva (1989) declared,  
[N]o matter what the moment and the circumstances of its appearance in the animal scale were, 
language could only have been born in a single stroke. Objects couldn’t just start to signify 
progressively. After a transformation ... a passage was effected from a stage where nothing made 
sense to another where everything did. (p. 46) 
This seems to me worth noting, for such a perspective takes the invention of language by the symbolic 
species (Deacon, 1997) out of the natural unfolding of genetic evolution and sees cultural creativity as 
changing our hominid heritage. This has the advantage of admitting that the human species is different in 
kind from all other species, a position made unpopular today by cognitive science, sociobiology, and 
evolutionary psychology. But being qualitatively unique for being in possession of a reflexive symbol 
system that can direct cultures and alter genes need not result in magnified anthropocentrism. Instead we 
could feel the fear and trembling of those who must bear the awful responsibility of playing a role in the 
ongoing biological evolution on this planet. But even this sounds unnecessarily grandiose. The fact is 
that humans give evidence of their uniqueness in private, daily practices like, say, feeding wild birds in 
winter, which neither increases social status nor enhances the likelihood of passing on their genes. 
Be that as it may, the inclusion of symbolism as an evolutionary determinant is a breakthrough idea, at 
least in the sciences, and, though sometimes resisted by the authors, it recognizes the unique status of 
humanity on this planet, the creature who influences its own evolution, realizing that human culture and 
lived experience are constructing the next moment (unlike Savage-Rumbaugh’s captive bonobo, in spite 
of their occasional symbol use). The role we already play in the planet’s future is readily apparent. 
If the authors are correct in their current interpretation of evo-devo (evolution + development, each 
influencing the other) – and they certainly make a very strong case – then the scientism of the extreme 
neo-Darwinists, sociobiologists, or evolutionary psychologists must certainly make room in their 	123
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theorizing for the fact that experience, learning, and human symbolic interaction influence not only 
development but also epigenetic and thus genetic evolution. Our future is neither random nor 
predetermined, in this case, but it is indeed in our hands and the choices we make as a people. Finally, 
their last two dimensions of evolution help to explain and evaluate theories of development. 
3. Development 
3.1 Nature versus Nurture 
This is not the place to review all major theories of development or theories of learning related to 
development, but I will continue my theme by looking at major theories that include social factors in 
learning and possibly allow for cultural creativity. I see such cultural creativity as not necessarily 
growing out of environmental factors, as in behaviourism, or genetic factors, as in evolutionary biology. 
Cultural creativity may appear out of nothing but necessity.  From what has gone before, we can see that 3
such cultural creativity, if maintained over generations, may actually change the genome and become 
part of the human heritage. This is not recognized in the review of most developmental theories that 
follows.  
From the late 19th century onwards, we see the great antagonists, nurture and nature, proceeding on their 
agendas. Pavlov began his work on training dogs to salivate to demonstrate the power of environmental 
conditioning even as the early neo-Darwinists reached an epitome of influence in scientific circles. It 
seemed to many that either “man” was a machine (La Mettrie, 1748), albeit an evolved one, or he was a 
hapless product of social conditioning. At this time, a new force, psychology, became evident in the 
work of Freud, and now humans were seen as hapless products of the sexual repressions of the 
unconscious mind, the repressions being nurture but the sexual libido being nature. In fact, Freud 
developed a “psychosexual” developmental theory in which the individual had to maneuver between the 
Scylla of social repression and the Charybdis of the uncivilized id or libido to attain appropriate genital-
centered sexuality in maturity (Freud, 1915/2011). There is no other choice but neuroses. No choice 
seems to be the underlying theme of most evo-devo theories that see human beings as products. 
Other developmental or learning theorists who have had an influence on education can often be placed 
into either the environmental or the genetic determinist camp with only a few seeing cultural or 
individual creativity, often based in the acquisition of formal language structures, as an alternative camp 
of its own that by definition is never pre-determined. Among the early perspectives to perceive that 
complex social communications allowed for the possibility of humanity expressing the creative freedom 
that is already present in nature is the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1911/83) in France and 
simultaneously that of the major pragmatists in the United States. The latter group sometimes included 
the early social behaviourists who refused to be confined within the stringent restrictions of the 
emerging environmental conditioning theories of behaviourism that denied that humans had free will 
and even that human consciousness was an illusion (Watson, 1913; Skinner, 1972).  
3.2 Behaviourism and Environmental Determinism 
 The Ancient Greeks regarded necessity as the Goddess Ananke (Hillman) – so overwhelming were her powers of creating 3
the pathological anxiety that results in necessary actions (cf. Hillman, 1980).
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Nearly everything that can be said about the vast canvas of behaviourism has been said. It certainly 
makes the strongest case for environmental determinism against the influence of instincts, inherited 
character traits, and genetic influence in general. As noted, it works by assuming all animals, including 
humanity, are basically hedonistic, that is, pleasure seeking and pain avoiding. In this way, any animal, 
individually or in groups, can be trained in any way conceivable if someone controls how and when 
those pleasurable rewards are given or withheld. 
For this reason – the unfairness inherent in the idea of there being the trainers and the trained – 
behaviourism has received much opprobrium. However, there is little doubt that infants, toddlers, and 
young children need to be trained for they do not have the wherewithal to make informed choices. There 
is also little doubt that, in spite of all sorts of liberated classrooms and enlightened teachers who cater to 
individual needs, the structure of the school system is itself based on the principles of behaviourism (and 
the military). If one works hard and succeeds, one may do well in school subjects and be rewarded by 
moving upward through the grades. If one does not, one will eventually be forced out of the system. This 
is not even to mention the rewarding warmth and praise bestowed by teachers and parents on those 
children who do well and the lack of same for those children who do not. 
So behaviourism (which prospers these days under the sobriquet of neobehaviourism in which it is 
admitted that people do have minds but only the illusion of choice-making) is a suitable way to manage 
animals and young children in accord with the third dimension of evolution in Jablonka and Lamb 
(2006). But biological constraints on behavioural conditioning, in accord with Jablonka and Lamb’s first 
two dimensions, must be admitted, including autoshaping, inherited behaviours that appear without 
regard for reinforcement, and instinctive drift, the tendency of organisms to revert to instinctual, 
unlearned behaviours (LeFrançois, 2011). Recent work on the appearance of altruism (Erikson, 1980; 
Fletcher & Doebeli, 2009; Tomasello 1999, 2015) also denies the fundamental self-serving drive on 
which behaviourism depends. Most of all, however, it is the fully human symbolic activity whose 
complexity allows for degrees of free agency and cultural creativity – the final evolutionary dimension 
in Jablonka and Lamb – that reveals that behaviourism is not a suitable explanation for human action,  4
and that such training certainly should not be the sole means of education for maturing students. No 
doubt in our culture the enormous power of behaviourism’s conditioning techniques will continue to be 
employed in advertising, election campaigning, and propaganda. 
Behaviourism as neobehaviourism opened the way to (and was often replaced by) social behaviourism 
(Mead, 1934), social psychology (Lewin, 1935), and social learning theory (Bandura, 1977; Vygotsky, 
1978), all of which put the community before the individual in the development of the self, as will be 
seen below. But before I continue on the trajectory to current research into the development of unique 
self-consciousness in humans (Rochat, 2009) and the shared intentionality (Tomasello, 2008) that allows 
for such self-consciousness, speech (Tomasello, 2005), thinking (Tomasello, 2014), and human morality 
(Tomasello, 2015), the opposite trend to environmental determinism must be outlined, i.e., genetic 
determinism.  
 It should be noted that it was the publication of linguist Noam Chomsky’s “A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal 4
Behaviour” (1959) that rang the death knell on the huge influence behaviourism had been enjoying. 	125
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3.3 The Cognitivist Revolution and Genetic Determinism 
The evolutionary genetic camp has come a long way since the early neo-Darwinists found influential 
footholds in sociobiology (Wilson, 1975) and evolutionary psychology (e.g., Buss, 1999). It may have 
reached its apogee of influence in the 1990s with the publication of The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & 
Murray, 1994) and the claim that inherited intelligence is the primary determiner of social success. The 
rise of cognitive science carried this position forward both in neuroscience and, perhaps surprisingly, in 
the artificial intelligence program of computer science. In either case, the human individual is often 
regarded as a cipher without free will who only carries out its programming either on the wetware of the 
brain (e.g., Bridgeman, 1990) or the metaphoric hardware of the brain-as-computer. For example, the 
seemingly unpredictable behaviour of teen-agers can now apparently be explained through studies of 
teen-age brains, as revealed in two popular periodicals (Dobbs, 2011; Giedd, 2015).  
Though in a very broad and less determinist fashion, evolutionary materialism as found in cognitive 
science or, simply, cognitivism as it is known in much of today’s educational psychology literature, is 
flourishing today as the dominant developmental and learning theory (see, e.g., Gelman, 1978; 
LeFrançois, 2011; Bigge & Shermis, 2004; Woolfolk, 2012). Cognitivism, however, comes in many 
varieties, from the human brain as individual serial computer to the human brain as a parallel network 
information processor that learns and adapts to its learning. All cognitivism, however, depends on the 
assumption that the brain is what learns and adapts in human beings, the implication being that humans 
are essentially physically carapaces around their central processing organ, the brain, which functions on 
computational principles to determine which actions to take. Such information processing may include 
an element of free will, at least in terms of the choosing which information to process; that is, one may 
choose a focus for one’s attention to some degree. However, there remains the problem of fully 
explaining how such independent information processors, as brains are assumed to be, can connect with 
other brains and, though such connectionism, learn such things as shared intentions, altruism and 
morality, which are usually considered value-laden judgments to do with sensed meaning. 
It was Jerome Bruner, one of the most influential developmental theorists, who made the switch from 
structural information processing to narrative meaning making in the 1970s and 1980s in a series of 
memorable books and articles, beginning with “Beyond the Information Given” (1973). It had been 
Bruner’s intention to make the break from behaviourism by illustrating how humans create their own 
conscious selves and make their own meaning through shared narratives (Bruner, 1987, 1990a), but he 
inadvertently opened the door to cognitivism instead when his theories of meaning making were reduced 
to information processing, in which consciousness is not necessarily required. 
“We were not out to ‘reform’ behaviourism but to replace it” (p. 3), wrote Bruner (1990b). “There is no 
one explanation of man,” [and no explanation of the human condition can make sense] “without being 
interpreted in the light of the symbolic world that constitutes human culture” (p. 138). Bruner here is 
clearly in accord with the uniquely human fourth dimension in the evolutionary approach of Jablonka 
and Lamb (2006), so, as such, he becomes the inheritor of the ideas of Cassirer (1944, 1946) with regard 
to the transcultural importance of symbolism in the revelation of the human mind.  
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He is also carrying forward the formative suggestions of Mead (1934), who posited the sense of self as 
arising only through social interaction, and Vygotsky (1978), who saw the self as a social construction 
that could then act to influence the society that called it forth. His emphasis on symbolic narratives in 
the construction of the human world seems inspired by the sociological theories of Goffman (1959), 
Berger and Luckman (1967) and Blumer (1969), as well as the important theories of dynamic memory 
construction in Bartlett (1932) and Halbwachs (1925/1992). These theories do not name cultural 
consciousness but often assume it. How could the need for meaning determine neural processing in the 
individual monad of the isolated human brain? Cassirer’s emphasis on myth and Bruner’s emphasis on 
narrative indicate the understanding that human brains connect to each other through symbolic 
communication channels that allow a cultural network to function as an extension of individual brains. 
As a well-known linguist wrote: “When language is made overt, as in speaking and writing, it is able to 
provide a link between what would otherwise be independent nervous systems, acting as an imperfect 
substitute for the synapses that fail to bridge the gap from one mind to another” (Chafe, 1994, p. 41). 
Bruner’s revolution was “an all-out effort to establish meaning as the central concept of psychology – 
not stimuli and responses, not overtly observable behaviour, not biological drives and their 
transformation, but meaning” (1990b, p. 2). But this emphasis was shanghaied by the cognitive 
revolution in which the key idea was changed from constructing meaning to processing information, and 
the dominant metaphor for human decision-making changed from social-emotional engagement to the 
computer. It is probably fair to say that neuroscience and the computer analogy remain the dominant 
paradigms in development theory today, each supporting the other and both failing to acknowledge the 
power of symbolism and relational intersubjectivity in the formation of individual consciousness. 
3.4 Social Constructivists 
Before meeting two current researchers who provide strong experimental evidence for the 
intersubjective origin of symbolic community and thus for human self-consciousness, in all fairness it 
should be noted that throughout the 1980s and onward, strong theories emerged that continued to 
support the primacy human interrelations and the vital importance of shared intentionality in a 
community. Erikson’s identity crisis notions (1980), first published in 1959, leave the responsibility for 
choosing the right path through such crises with the individual and the influences upon him or her. 
Bandura (1977, 1986, 1991) with his social-cognitive theory of development is an important transitional 
figure who found a mediating path between cognitivism and social learning theory. Kegan’s (1982) 
processes of human evolution and development (evo-devo) strongly emphasize how creative insight 
allows one to incorporate past stages and advance forward into a less self-constricted, more transcultural 
sense of being. Fogel (1993) makes a very strong but not widely read case for relationality as essential 
for the emergence of the individual. Neisser (1993) through inspired psychological experiments 
demonstrates that our self-perception is learned from the environment and others. The current research 
trajectory that I now review opposes the reductionist determinism of both the environment and genetics.   5
 Though often given credit for social constructionism, I leave out Piaget here for his stage theories ultimately rest in his 5
background in biology, which he considers the source of cognition (e.g, Modgil & Modgil, 1982; Pfeiffle, 2008). I feel the 
credit should go instead to Mead (1934), Lewin (1935), and Vygotsky (1978). Aside from Kristeva (1989), I do not make 
mention of continental philosophy or the postmodern movement either, in spite of their embrace of the language-is-
consciousness position, for I am following rational empiricism here, something most postmoderns reject (cf. Curtler, 1997). 	127
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4. Current Research in Evo-Devo 
4.1 Introduction 
Aside from being relatively more current, the research and writing of Michael Tomasello (1999, 2005, 
2008, 2014, 2015) and Philippe Rochat (1999, 2001, 2009, 2014) have also undergone extensive 
investigation both in the laboratory and the field, often using innovative experiments, before interpretive 
theory began, unlike many of the less grounded theories mentioned above. Their work is both empirical 
yet insightfully interpretive. Both work with patterns in phylogenetic evolution and ontogenetic 
development; however, Rochat’s research has been more explicitly developmental in early childhood. 
Rochat more boldly rejects the neuroscientific and the evolutionary paradigms as the determining factors 
in individual development and looks to cultural creativity, but, in spite of his declared allegiance to 
evolutionary psychology, I suggest Tomasello inadvertently moves into the social constructionist camp 
himself. 
4.2 Tomasello 
Tomasello has been something of a publishing industry on his own these passed 20 years or so. 
Admittedly, as the co-director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, 
Germany, he must have numerous graduate assistants or laboratory researchers to assist him in his 
efforts. He straddles both sides of the evo-devo world, “his work – combining studies on large apes and 
children – is unparalleled in the field” (Pléh, 2014, p. 979). 
Tomasello is also notable in that his basic theoretic position – that humanity diverges from other animals 
including the great apes because of their evolved cognitive ability to focus attention together – has 
undergone several revisions over the years as new experiments with children or with apes have revealed 
shortcomings to him. His willingness to adapt and revise is to be lauded. At this point, however, he 
remains unwilling to loosen his credentials as an evolutionary psychologist (at least according to Pléh, 
2014) and reconsider his allegiance to the controversial “theory of mind” perspective, so popular today. 
This effects his final position in that he must explain the natural evolution of cognition as preceding the 
appearance of speech, and, according to Tomasello, what led to the unique advance in human cognition 
was the human need to work together in such things as the hunt and in maintaining social cohesion as 
families united to become tribes (Tomasello, 1995, 1999). Early on, he called this unique cognitive 
ability shared attention, but when shared attention was shown to be fairly commonplace among great 
apes that were studied, he made the significant adaptation to instead referencing shared intentionality 
(2005, 2008) as the unique human ability. 
The difference is important since a group of apes may have their attention on the same activity but still 
be stuck in selfish egocentricity. A good example is the group monkey hunt of the chimpanzees. At first 
glance, they seem to work in coordinated fashion to isolate and corner an individual monkey, but a 
closer look reveals that each chimp is hunting only for himself, seeking to be among the first to render 
the poor monkey and get to the meat or be among the first of the secondary beggars, who usually know 
who to approach for hand-outs. There is no food-sharing or bringing back the spoils to the village, 
which, amongst early humans, is the signature of a cooperative culture. Such coordinated hunting 
strategy, sometimes lasting days or even weeks, and the subsequent sharing of the spoils is what 
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Tomasello means by shared intentionality. It must be noted that the give and take of first level gestural 
speech requires such cognitive abilities so both the sender and the receiver can imagine the intention of 
the other. Second level speech, however, in which formal linguistic structures with both semantics and 
syntax and the ability to speak of the past, future, and the far away demands a degree of cultural 
cooperation and symbolic passing of traditions for which evolution can not be given credit. 
This perspective on human communication and language thus basically turns the Chomskian 
[genetic] proposal on its head, as the most fundamental aspects of human communication are 
seen as biological adaptations for cooperation and social interaction in general, whereas the more 
purely linguistic, including grammatical, dimensions of language are culturally constructed and 
passed along by individual linguistic communities. (Tomasello, 2008, p. 11, my italics) 
It is Tomasello’s turn toward cultural construction that tends to separate him from the evolutionary 
biologists. It’s strange he still accepts a version of the theory of mind (ToM) perspective. Crudely, a ToM 
assumes that a fully established mind or self is in each individual and that this self or mind can only 
mentally infer a similar self or mind in others by observing their behaviour and elaborating a theory of 
mind for them based on noting the similarities with one’s own behaviour. The idea that the self comes 
with the body seems to be inherent to both behaviourism and sociobiology, but there is no reason to 
make such an assumption. As neuroscientist and philosopher, Alva Noë (2009) states in another context: 
[ToM] takes for granted from the start that all that is available to us is the mere behaviour of 
others; it takes for granted that minds are hidden and private. It also takes for granted that the 
minds of others are real for us only as a kind of theoretical device to help us manage our dealings 
with others. (p. 30) 
That fact that Tomasello sees shared intentionality as necessary for first level symbol exchange found in 
gesture and sign (probably carried on for millions of years amongst hominids and shown to be 
occasionally present amongst great apes and cetaceans brought up in captivity) might have implied to 
him that a shared social identity could have preceded individual identification. That is, there is no need 
to posit a ToM by isolated selves if the isolated self-identity is preceded by identification with each other 
as a tribe, as is indicated in other evo-devo theories (e.g., Bruner, 1987; Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1978). 
This idea is occasionally acknowledged by Tomasello (2014) himself when he cites Vygotsky and 
Bakhtin as his intellectual antecedents and when he moves into his recent discussions of the now 
renamed joint intentionality and, the next step, collective intentionality. The latter apparently concerns 
humanity after the advent of fully self-referential, syntactically and semantically-driven formal language 
in symbolically interactive cultural groups. At this point, “cooperative communication became 
conventional linguistic communication” (2014, p. 5), so differing viewpoints could assume a neutral, 
objective stance to win adherents. “Because the collaboration and communication at this point were 
conventional, institutional, and normative, we may refer to all this as collective intentionality” (pp. 5-6, 
italics in original). Tomasello avoids the “c” word, consciousness, likely because of controversies in that 
field, but I suggest joint intentionality might be understood as cultural consciousness, and collective 
intentionality as social consciousness; or, better, considering Tomasello’s move into moral philosophy, 
as social conscience. 	129
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Perhaps it should not be surprising that this latter concept has been thoroughly resisted, especially in the 
United States, as the word “collective” is felt to be anathema to the Ayn Rand, Adam Smith sort of 
individual competitiveness that is the cornerstone of capitalism. Such selfish individualism is the 
primary assumption of behaviourism and neo-Darwinism too, but the whole notion of an intersubjective 
collective preceding self-identity as an individual undermines all of these perspectives. 
Perhaps predictably, in Tomasello’s most recent book (2015), he applies these principles to an 
explanation for the conventional morality found in cultural groups. With his background researches, he 
makes a strong case. His view that joint intentionality and, later, collective intentionality are not only 
how we discern altruistic morality but are also the foundation for all that makes us uniquely human must 
be taken seriously.  
However, when he assumes that evolutionary cognitive development must have been in place before the 
phylogenetic appearance of formal language, one must be more critical. As above, it is conceivable that 
out of necessity humans invented linguistic forms that could refer to the origins of identity in the distant 
past, envision the far away and the yet to come, and create narrative myths to express meaning to 
themselves (cf. Barfield, 1977; Dewart, 1989; Nixon, 2010). The cultural invention of, first, gestural 
representation millions of years ago, and of formal language about 60 to 100 thousand years ago, could 
have led to later evolutionary changes, or at least to the co-evolution of language and the brain, as in 
Deacon (1997). This would match Jablonka and Lamb (2006). 
4.3 Rochat  
Rochat is more radical in his approach, specifically dealing with the evolution and the development of 
consciousness, and daring to suggest that, as self-conscious persons, we each arise from our own 
mutuality. In general, his work has been less concerned with the evolutionary background than 
Tomasello, but his extensive work with infants has led him to postulate that uniquely human self-
consciousness results from the mutual interaction of the infant’s body with objects and ultimately with 
other people. It is an ecological-phenomenological approach that sees the early child as both reactive to 
the world around it and in an important sense independently creative in its response to it. Self-
consciousness is the continuing sense of identity that comes with long-term memory that is, in turn, 
enabled through the emergence of early speech patterns learned from others. In his recent book most 
relevant to this monograph, Others in Mind: Social Origins of Self-Consciousness (2009), Rochat 
considers both the “evo” part of the evo-devo pairing while also daring to break scientific habit by 
taking questions of self and consciousness seriously, both in individual development and in the 
evolutionary emergence of “modern” behaviours in H. sapiens (especially after the emergence of formal 
language structures). 
As the title indicates, Rochat is addressing the origins of self-consciousness, not the self as an assumed 
entity per se. “There is no such thing as a ‘core’ or an ‘individual self’,” Rochat declares. “I propose 
instead that what develops and is unique to human ontogeny is a sense of self that is co-constructed in 
relation to others” (p. 3, italics in original). Being conscious of one’s self in relation to others is found 
only in human development, and Rochat makes this clear from the beginning. Though once a student of 
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Piaget, Rochat more takes his cue from such as Dewey (1916), Mead (1934), Goffman (1959), and 
Vygotsky (1978), when he declares: 
I start from the simple fact that without others, we would not be. As infants we would not have 
survived. As adults, we would not have any explicit sense of who we are; we would have no 
ability, nor any inclination to be self-conscious. (p. 2, italics in original) 
In other words we have an overwhelming desire to be with others, to be recognized by them, and to 
share in social intimacy. The other side of the coin of desire is fear, and for Rochat, “The fear of social 
rejection is the mother of all fears” (p. 3). One’s sense of self becomes deformed under the umbrage of 
such rejection, and the earlier it takes place, the more powerful its influence. In short, “[S]elf-
consciousness stands for the representation we hold of ourselves through the eyes of others.” Continuing 
with words that could have come from Mead, “[T]his representation is in essence a social construction, 
as opposed to an individual elaboration. … [It] originates in relation to others” (p. 3, italics in original). 
Very early in this book, Rochat sets out his parameters. The rest of the book is a fleshing out of these 
ideas, with some philosophical elaboration and some examination of unusual situations and possible 
applications. It should be noted that, in spite of his theoretic predecessors, Rochat’s views derive from 
many years of close study of infants, toddlers, and young children, beginning in the early 1980s. By the 
end of the 1990s, he was working with others on a version of social psychology involving symbolic 
interaction (Tomasello, Striano, & Rochat, 1999). In short, Rochat’s theories have grounding. 
Rochat does not veer off into drawn-out discussions on the nature of consciousness, though he does 
agree with philosophers like Merleau-Ponty that consciousness, or, better, awareness, exists as embodied 
experience in a pre-self-conscious manner, what some call phenomenological consciousness. For Rochat 
(and others) self-consciousness creates the objective self – the self as seen from the imagined 
perspective of others – that “becomes increasingly external as it refers more and more to the evaluative 
eyes of others” (p. 11). Such an objectification involves higher mental functions that are not in any way 
determined by the brain, though one may admit they are limited by it. At such levels, each brain 
functions amongst a network of brains. Rochat, echoing Chafe (1994), writes: 
The brain is indeed adapted and shaped to live in a society of minds. If the brain of an individual 
can be anatomically described as a distinct entity, it can hardly be described as such at most 
levels of higher functioning, including self-reflection or self-conceptualization. Most of what the 
brain allows an individual to perform is done in conjunction with other brains, particularly 
performances such as thinking and talking, even thinking and talking about the self. This basic 
fact questions the validity of construing the locus of conscious phenomena in the brain of the 
individual since most of these phenomena depend on conjugate functioning with other brains. (p. 
10) 
This is an explicit statement that marks the move into cultural creativity (aka cultural construction) as a 
source outside the brain for the brain’s neural functioning. The focal point and apparent source of all our 
thinking, reflection, and recognition is the self each of us knows as I or me. Rochat is not the first to 	131
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emphasize that this self is created as we become conscious of it from the perspective of others, and that 
this self-consciousness is projected by our pre-reflective, embodied awareness:  
[T]he sense and concept of self cannot be conceived independently of the sense and concept of 
others. They are mutually defining as the two sides of a coin. The basic intuition is that when we 
think of ourselves, we always and inescapably have others in mind. (p. 14, italics in the original) 
Rochat has tested his views by comparing multicultural perspectives, including Melanesian children in 
Vanuatu, and finds evidence amongst the symbolic speech patterns, ritual behaviours, and taboos for the 
need to be recognized and included and the deep fear of isolation and rejection. Key to such 
understanding is always found in language and symbol, as in all cultures. 
But only the human animal is able to attain such a full symbolic capacity all the time. And this is 
concomitant upon the ability to become co-conscious with other members of the group. This applies in 
both evolutionary and developmental stages of consciousness. It must be remembered that Rochat sees 
these stages first emerging in the individual at a very young age, and, after crossing from one to the next, 
the emerging self will often slip back to former stages of consciousness throughout his or her life as each 
new stage is nested in those that went before. 
Rochat’s list of levels or stages of “consciousness” follows (and these stages are what his make his 
views so unique and important): 1. Non-conscious states of the mind are by definition unknowable but 
may be equated with lower life forms or dreamless states of sleep. 2. Unconscious states of mind are 
understood to be mental contents that have been forgotten or repressed or otherwise ignored. Here he 
ignores the deeper Jungian theory of a collective unconscious in favour of a more Freudian view. 3. 
Aware mind states are just that, awareness without differentiation into mental categories or self-
reflection. 4. Co-awareness seems to apply to many animals, including warm-blooded mammals; it 
refers to the simple awareness of the presence of others in the group but without the mind-to-mind links 
provided by symbols. 5. Consciousness, Rochat notes, derives from the Greek suneidesis meaning 
“communal knowledge” (p. 50), and I must add from the Latin conscius, meaning “knowing together”. 
It refers to emotional knowing in the individual being. “It exists and vanishes with the body” (p. 52). 6. 
Co-consciousness, however, is the unique human achievement, which should by now be clear in 
meaning. “I know with others in mind: I become co-conscious” (p. 54, italics in original). It need hardly 
be said that being co-conscious with other minds in a group is a dynamic process, so it must involve 
shared avoidances as well as shared intentions, which was made clear in my discussion of Tomasello.  
It must be admitted that these theoretic stages do not emerge directly from Rochat’s research and are, in 
fact, idiosyncratic. From the perspective of consciousness studies, this list is not likely to receive wide 
acceptance. The most notable contribution is his concept of co-consciousness: the mutuality of minds 
that occurs after one behaves as a conscious organism, according to Rochat. However, as seen above, the 
word conscious already implies “knowing together” (Latin: con + scire), and it may well be that such 
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knowing together precedes the consciousness of self, just as Bruner (1987) indicated.  This suggests co-6
consciousness might be better understand as, simply, cultural consciousness. To the extent that co-
consciousness can be equated with cultural consciousness, its boundaries seem to fluctuate as do the 
individuals in an identifiable group, but such boundaries certainly exceed individual embodiment. So, 
though individual phenomenology may “vanish with the body”, co-consciousness, i.e., cultural 
consciousness does not.  
In any case, it can be seen that conscious behavioural learning is in accord with the third dimension of 
evolution in Jablonka and Lamb (2006). Furthermore, human co-consciousness is made possible only 
with the emergence into symbolic interaction, which depends on the group, so Rochat’s final stage of 
individual development matches the fourth dimension of evolution found in Jablonka and Lamb. 
This is sufficient coverage of Rochat for now to serve my purpose. It should be clear that Rochat’s views 
on the origin of self-consciousness lie beyond the individual brain in co-consciousness – which I feel is 
better identified as cultural consciousness – thus in cultural creativity or construction. For such 
mutuality of identity to emerge, some form of symbolic communication (or interaction), such as 
language, is necessary as the basis for what might even better be called symbolic communion. In this 
way, we might be seen as the self-creative species, the species that has achieved cultural consciousness 
at least some of the time. Other times, admittedly, our self-created cultures find themselves hostile to 
each other (or within each other) and the biggest threat to human existence becomes other human 
existents.  
5. Conclusion 
I have undertaken this compressed survey to demonstrate how a line of thinking that I have called 
cultural creativity, akin to cultural constructivism, began between the polar extremes of environmental 
determinism, i.e., behaviourism, and genetic determinism, i.e., neo-Darwinism, the latter of which 
dominates evo-devo theories today in a less deterministic fashion in the guises of sociobiology, 
evolutionary psychology, and the information processing model of cognitivism. I have traced the line 
that emphasizes human creativity in the face of nonspecific necessity (perhaps in the nature of an 
existential crisis) through revisionist evolutionary theories, social behaviourism, social psychology, 
symbolic interactionism, constructive theories of memory, autopoietic systems theory in biology, and 
through narrative theories in linguistics. Finally, I have shone a light on recent research that emphasizes 
the attainment of degrees of freedom via the complexities of symbolic culture – especially in Jablonka 
and Lamb (2006), Tomasello (2008, 2014, 2015), and Rochat (2009). Such cultural creativity implies the 
possibility that we have entered the level of consciousness in which we are able to direct our own 
evolution and development (perhaps in the creative unconscious), but I have also hinted that the failure 
to rise to such terrible responsibility could be humanity’s undoing. 
 Mead (1934), as often, anticipated this viewpoint. Philosopher Paul Ricoeur later made the strong case for individual 6
subjectivity (self-consciousness) arising from intersubjectivity, a primary identification with others, in Oneself as Another 
(1995). Learning the social codes of language already implies being drawn into otherness (Cassirer, 1944; Deacon, 1997; 
Kristeva, 1989). Identifying with others before we learn to objectively identify our selves with our embodied experience 
means such positions as the cognitivist theory of mind and philosophic solipsism become absurd. 	133
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I would like to bring this survey to close with a very brief look at the implications of accepting and 
applying this recent research into cultural creativity in the fields of education, politics, and ontology. 
However, the major authors I’ve cited have directly endorsed none of these implications.  
In education, it need only be said that fostering joint or collective intentionality requires a firm mastery 
of expressive symbolic interaction, especially language, to leave childhood’s behavioural third 
dimension of Jablonka and Lamb (2006) and enter the symbolic fourth dimension. To attain the 
independent agency that comes with full self-consciousness requires that we accept our dependence on 
and responsibility to others with whom we must learn to relate cooperatively or in the rationally based 
manner of fair-play competition. We need to be taught social conscience, which is already presaged by 
the infant’s primary empathy. This recalls the suggestions that have been made for decades to do with 
guided group work or group projects that involve joint intentions or even social engagement projects 
that call upon collective intentions. Education would have to be based in real experience and built on 
democratic principles. Sound familiar? It should, but the progressive theories of John Dewey (1916) and 
others have never been implemented across the curriculum or throughout the nation. Entering the 
emerging age of the Internet may change all that. 
In politics, to the evident distress of many, the work cited above points to the vital importance of 
collective action, putting community needs before those of the individual and distributing the wealth 
fairly but not necessarily equally amongst the population. This appears to be the way that our ancestors 
first created cultures and self-conscious persons within those communities, with the added necessity of 
self-referential symbolic communication, of course. The faith in “enlightened self-interest” now appears 
to be a recent invention based in the misinterpretation of nature as found in social Darwinism and used 
by the privileged ever since to justify their unequal hoarding of wealth and power. What’s most natural 
to humans, however, is sharing and living together for the good of all, i.e., cultural consciousness and 
social conscience. 
There are ontological implications of these evo-devo theories of cultural creativity, too. This is not the 
first time that cultural creativity as opposed to genetics alone has been given credit for the awakening of 
symbolic human culture (cf. Bergson, 1983; Cassirer, 1944; Dewart, 1989; Greenspan & Shanker, 2004; 
Richerson & Boyd, 2005). But cultural creativity could not be the creation of creativity; creativity did 
not make its first appearance with culture but in fact must be assumed to be an aspect of evolution, the 
primary mover of the universe itself (cf. Baldwin, 1894; Bergson, 1911/1983; Capra, 1996; Ho, 2003; 
Maturana & Varela, 1980). Kauffman (2008) refers to creativity in nature as sacred while Nagel (2012) 
sees it as implying a teleology, a purpose, in evolution; both identify themselves as atheists. In this way, 
creativity itself is seen as the autopoietic source of destinies – as the strange attractor of systems theory – 
and should be respected as such if not held in awe (though A. N. Whitehead (1929/1978) regarded 
creativity itself as the unconscious but godlike prime mover). Of course, creation and destruction alike 
may appear from unguided creativity, so it is incumbent on us to educate our children in a manner that 
valorizes open creative activity over the closed and deterministic, yet calls upon critical thinking and 
rational balance to guide our creative cultural unfolding. 
It goes without saying that further research along these lines will help clarify these ideas. 
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